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This article discusses the need for more satisfactory implicit measures in consumer psychology
and assesses the theoretical foundations, validity, and value of the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) as a measure of implicit consumer social cognition. Study 1 demonstrates the IAT’s sen
sitivity to explicit individual differences in brand attitudes, ownership, and usage frequency,
and shows their correlations with IAT-based measures of implicit brand attitudes and brand re
lationship strength. In Study 2, the contrast between explicit and implicit measures of attitude
toward the ad for sportswear advertisements portraying African American (Black) and Euro
pean American (White) athlete–spokespersons revealed different patterns of responses to ex
plicit and implicit measures in Black and White respondents. These were explained in terms of
self-presentation biases and system justification theory. Overall, the results demonstrate that
the IAT enhances our understanding of consumer responses, particularly when consumers are
either unable or unwilling to identify the sources of influence on their behaviors or opinions.

Understanding of consumers’ mental states has been a chief
concern in consumer research. It is therefore not surprising
that psychology has had a profound paradigmatic impact on
the field. Like psychologists, consumer researchers have re
lied heavily on “self-reports of attitudes, stereotypes and
other beliefs, preferences, values, goals and motives”
(Kihlstrom, 2004, p. 195). Although these procedures have
been efficient, convenient, and economical measures and
have brought great advances, the advances have been contin
gent on key assumptions. It has been assumed generally that
“people were aware of their attitudes, beliefs, and values that
guided their behavior, and that they would be willing to reveal them if asked appropriately” (Kihlstrom, 2004, p. 195).
Of course, these assumptions might not always be valid, as
people are sometimes unable or unwilling to reveal their
opinions (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

Often, consumers are aware of their own attitudes or opin
ions but are reluctant to share them with unfamiliar research
ers. This is usually true of questions that are highly charged,
where responses might be embarrassing or where people feel
compelled to produce a socially acceptable answer
(Kihlstrom, 2004). Then, consumers might resort to impres
sion management and report distorted answers. For example,
“dark side behavior” research is often susceptible to socially
desirable responding (Mick, 1996). Self-report measures of
constructs such as vanity (Netemeyer, Burton, &
Lichtenstein, 1995) and stigmatized behaviors (e.g., compul
sive shopping, Mowen & Spears, 1999; or smoking, Rozin &
Singh, 1999) may also be prone to response management.
Procedures that could measure these constructs at the im
plicit level would provide quantifiable insights into the un
derlying automatic associations that consumers make. In ad
dition, a substantial portion of consumption is shaped by
cognitive processes that are outside conscious awareness
(e.g., Bargh, 2002; Zaltman, 2000) and have influences that
consumers do not realize (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Re

cently, psychologists have shown renewed interest in this is
sue and have “reclaimed” the importance of the unconscious
(Greenwald, 1992; Weinberger, 2000). Although implicit so
cial cognition is still in its infancy, a surge of research has led
to measurement and theoretical advances (Fazio & Olson,
2003). We believe that consumer psychology should build on
this movement and that more research should investigate im
plicit consumer social cognition:1 that is, the automatic con
sumer affective processes and cognitions that exist outside of
conscious awareness or control.
However, measurement issues have often constrained our
understanding of implicit effects. Although researchers agree
that “valid measurement is the sine qua non of science” (Pe
ter, 1979, p. 6), a lack of satisfactory implicit measurement
tools has led consumer psychologists to depend a lot on ex
plicit measures. For example, research on incidental ad expo
sure (Janiszewski, 1993; Shapiro, 1999) assumes that prefer
ences are “formed independently of conscious processing”
(Janiszewski, 1988, p. 200). At the same time, however, this
research relies on self-report measures of attitude toward the
ad (Aad), recognition, and familiarity. In sum, whether it be
to circumvent the willingness or awareness issue, the avail
ability of valid implicit measures has become a theoretical
imperative (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
In this article, we (a) review the strengths and limitations
of past explicit and implicit measures; (b) assess the prop
erties and relevance of the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) as a measure of
implicit consumer social cognition; (c) offer empirical tests
of the IAT’s validity and sensitivity in a consumer behavior
setting; and (d) investigate whether the IAT is able to detect
consumer behavior effects that explicit measures cannot.
First, we discuss the merits and shortcomings of existing
measures. We next describe the IAT from procedural and
conceptual perspectives, examine its validity and limita
tions and explain how it can be used in consumer research.
Then, in Study 1, we test the validity and convergence of
IAT-based measures of implicit brand attitudes and consumer–brand relationship strength, contrasting them with
explicit measures of brand attitude, brand ownership, and
brand usage in a context where consumers would be willing
and able to share their evaluations (i.e., computer brands).
In Study 2, we report a divergence between IAT-based and
explicit measures of attitudes toward sportswear advertise
1Although published research suggests that there is not complete agree
ment on terminology, we use implicit versus explicit as a key delineation for
both measures and processes. This is consistent with the use of these terms in
social psychology, cognitive psychology, and consumer psychology. Other
labels have also been used: for example, unaware versus aware, unobtrusive
versus obtrusive, unconscious versus conscious, automatic versus con
trolled, and indirect versus direct. Although related, these terms have
slightly different theoretical underpinnings. We believe that the labels im
plicit versus explicit are most appropriate for this research, and are consis
tent with the terminology used in recent review articles (Fazio & Olson
2003; Kihlstrom, 2004).

ments that portray African American and White athletes. In
this experiment, unlike the first, some respondents were
likely to exert control over their answers to conform to so
cial desirability. In a subsequent follow-up study, we elimi
nate alternative explanations for these findings and confirm
that IAT effects are driven by evaluations of the category
being tested rather than evaluations of specific category ex
emplars. Finally, we discuss theoretical and measurement
implications of the results.

EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT MEASURES IN
CONSUMER RESEARCH
Explicit Measures
Most research on consumer social cognition has used ex
plicit measures of attitudes. There is ample evidence that
these measures satisfy important psychometric criteria such
as usefulness and efficiency (Mischel, 1968). Nevertheless,
they have limitations. The measures (e.g., Likert-type or se
mantic differential scales) typically reference a target object
in the participant’s personal history (Jacoby, Lindsay, &
Toth, 1992). Thus, they assume that the participant (a) has
already formed an opinion or is able to construct one on the
spot (see Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, for a discussion of the
constructionist perspective); (b) is aware of (i.e., has access
to) his or her attitude; and (c) is willing to share it accu
rately with the researcher. This article does not debate
whether attitudes are formed, stored, and retrieved or
whether they are constructed online. It would nonetheless
be tenuous to assume that all conditions can be met in all
situations (Jacoby et al., 1992). For our purpose, the last
two conditions are critical.
Awareness and willingness issues can be apparent in sev
eral ways. First, individuals who have never heard of a topic
are unlikely to have formed a prior attitude. To avoid appear
ing ignorant, however, they might still answer the question
(Hawkins & Coney, 1981). In other cases, previously formed
attitudes may not be easily accessible to the individual
(Fazio, 1986; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).
Thus, although individuals have a previously formed opin
ion, they report a newly created one. In addition, even if par
ticipants can identify a prior experience, they may be un
aware of its influence, hence providing inaccurate reports
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Also, respondents might pur
posefully distort their answers for social-desirability or im
age-management reasons. Distortions are especially likely
when an accurate response is seen as either violating social
norms such as politeness or prejudice (Demo, 1985; Dovidio
& Fazio, 1992), jeopardizing one’s self-image (Dovidio &
Fazio; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sirgy, 1982), or going
against the stereotypical answer (Haire, 1950). In short, no
explicit measure can truly avoid the influence of respondents’
control.

Implicit Measures
Because explicit measures are subject to conscious and un
conscious representations, implicit measures should uncover
different associations (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Devine, 1989;
Greenwald et al., 1998). In other words, implicit measures
are not “explicit measures without bias’ and they do not al
ways assess constructs identical to those assessed by explicit
measures. Although related, the two types of measures stem
from different information processing streams and appear
linked to activations in different regions of the brain
(Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003).
However, several factors, such as the type of object being as
sessed, self-presentation, or attitude elaboration, can influ
ence the correlation between them (Nosek & Banaji, 2002).
The exact nature of implicit attitudes and measures is sub
ject to debate (e.g., see Banaji, 2001, for a fervent essay on
this issue; or Kihlstrom, 2004, for an alternative perspective).
Part of the controversy stems from conceptual issues. Some
measures can be characterized as unobtrusive but not as im
plicit per se. In this restricted sense, they are used when peo
ple are aware of their attitudes, beliefs, or values but are un
willing to divulge them. However, these unobtrusive
measures have no merit if the investigation is concerned with
the measurement of implicit constructs (Kihlstrom, 2004)
and the consumer has no awareness of the construct of inter
est. Whereas implicit measures often can be used instead of
unobtrusive measures, the opposite is not true. Implicit mea
sures make no reference to objects in a participant’s personal
history (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Instead, they focus a
participant’s attention on performing some task that can indi
rectly reveal the underlying construct such that inaccessible
and closely held attitudes can be measured. For example,
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined implicit attitudes as
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified)
traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavor
able feelings, thoughts, or action toward social objects” (p.
8). As already mentioned, we should not look at implicit
measures as a “bona fide pipeline” (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton,
& Williams, 1995) that allows the measurement of “true” at
titudes. Indeed, “bona fide pipeline” only indicates that the
“automatic activation occurs farther upstream than the overt
response to an explicit measure” (Fazio & Olson, 2003; p.
304), not that one is true and the other is not.

Unstructured implicit measures. Generally, implicit
measures can be categorized as either disguised–unstruc
tured or disguised–structured (Campbell, 1950). They are
disguised because participants are aware they are participat
ing in a study but are typically unaware of what is truly being
assessed. Response alternatives can range from open and un
structured to a few structured alternatives (Lemon, 1973).
Projective measures (e.g., Rorschach Inkblot Test, the The
matic Apperception Test) are unstructured measures that ask
participants to react to a deliberately ambiguous stimulus. In

the process of completing the task, participants project parts
of themselves (e.g., attitudes, prejudices, fears, etc.) that can
then be interpreted (e.g., Haire, 1950).
Sentence or word completion and word association tests
are also used frequently. They are more structured than pro
jective techniques because the stimulus is less ambiguous
and the response options are more focused. Many projective
techniques have their roots in Freudian psychology, and al
though they continue to be popular in psychoanalytic circles
and in some marketing settings (especially in the case of sen
tence completion, word association, or collages), all have se
rious shortcomings. Even as projective techniques were in
tended to help measurement in situations where respondents
do not know something or are unable to communicate it
(Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1968), these measures often lack
convergent validity and are poor psychometric instruments
(Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2001). Further, specific conclu
sions (other than rich qualitative descriptions) can often be
flawed because of difficulties in coding and interpretation of
qualitative data (Churchill, 1995). Thus, their use should be
discouraged in causal, normative, or prescriptive settings
where specific and accurate measurements are needed.

Structured implicit measures. By limiting response
options, structured measures gain objectivity and avoid most
interpretation problems. With these measures, a participant’s
attention is focused on the completion of a task (e.g., group
ing pictures or words) with defined or undefined success cri
teria. Although these and explicit measures have convergent
validity, it is difficult to conceal the research goals in these
tasks (Lemon, 1973), and so image management remains an
issue. An information test is another type of structured im
plicit measure. It determines a participant’s knowledge of a
topic and has clearly defined success criteria. Because a par
ticipant’s attitude toward a topic should guide the selection
and retention of knowledge, this test provides an implicit
measure of that attitude (Campbell, 1950; Churchill, 1995).
Information tests are robust to social desirability if the pur
pose can be disguised (Lemon, 1973) but may be confounded
by need for cognition (Haugvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992).
Other measures with defined success criteria and robustness
to social desirability ask participants to estimate a group’s
opinion or identify the social norms of an event. However,
they do not provide any information about the automaticity
of attitude activation (Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). This is impor
tant because the stronger the associative network around an
attitude object, the more automatically the attitude will be ac
tivated, even if the attitude is weak (Bargh, 1989) or not con
sciously held (Fazio, 1986; Fazio et al., 1986).
Sequential priming (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto,
1992; Fazio et al., 1986) is a structured implicit measure that
does not suffer some of the previously mentioned limitations.
In these tasks, participants classify (target) words into cate
gories whereas the effect of the preceding (prime) stimulus
on classification speed is observed. A typical priming effect

is that the participant’s speed of classifying the target is
greater when the prime is associated with the target than
when it is not. Priming is flexible and can use verbal or non
verbal (e.g., pictures, shapes, faces) stimuli (Tulving &
Schacter, 1990). Variations of classic priming research have
been used to consider attitude activation. Response latencies
in the course of classifying target words as positive or nega
tive in evaluation are treated as measures of automatic atti
tude activation with the assumption that the “effect varies as a
function of associative strength” (Fazio, 2001, p. 123).
Effects of priming have been identified using both sublim
inal and conscious level exposures (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986;
Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). As Bargh (1994) noted,
“what matters more than whether one is aware of a stimulus
event is whether one is aware of the potential influence of
that event on subsequent experience and judgments” (p. 15).
Applications have included the following: the effect of tele
vision programming on perceptions of social reality (Shrum,
Wyer, & O’Guinn, 1998); contextual effects on print (Yi,
1993) and television advertising (Schmitt, 1994); and racial
attitudes and prejudice (Devine, 1989; Kawakami, Dion, &
Dovidio, 1998).
Priming research has also established limitations for the
measure. In particular, effects can be detected even with
weak primes, and the recency of prior access to the attitude
toward the prime might affect priming results by increasing
the activation level of the association (Bargh et al., 1992).
Also, priming measures often have relatively low internal
consistency and test–retest reliability (both often below .3).
In this case, priming measures are relatively insensitive to in
dividual differences (Bargh et al., 1992; Chaiken & Bargh,
1993). Finally, priming might have more value as a depend
ent measure (where larger between groups experimental ef
fects with minimal between-subject variance are desired)
than as an independent variable where more between-sub
jects variance is needed (Kihlstrom, 2004).

Summary. Researchers in consumer psychology often
need implicit measures of attitude when consumers are either
unaware or unwilling to reveal their opinions. However, em
pirical advances may have been limited by psychometric
shortcomings of the measures that have been employed. Con
sumer research would benefit from measures that display
greater convergent validity, reliability, sensitivity to individ
ual differences, and resilience to the effects of image man
agement and attitude accessibility. The IAT is examined as a
prospective solution to these measurement problems.

THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST
The IAT, which was formally introduced in 1998 (Greenwald
et al.), has gained rapid recognition (Kihlstrom, 2004) and
has become the most well-known implicit measure in psy
chology (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The IAT has been used to

measure product attitudes (Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin,
2001, 2004) and various implicit constructs in social psy
chology (see Fazio & Olson 2003; Greenwald et al., 2002; or
Kihlstrom, 2004, for reviews). To date, however, consumer
psychologists have not thoroughly probed the relevance, va
lidity, and general value of this measure. We first examine the
basic mechanics of the IAT and discuss the theoretical foun
dations of its measurement applications. We then turn our at
tention to more specific measurement issues including face,
content, and external validity and reliability. Finally, we dis
cuss some limitations and pending issues.
Conceptual and Measurement Description
The IAT is based on the premise that attitudes, stereotypes,
self-concepts, and self-esteem can be defined as associations
between concepts (Greenwald et al., 2002). This theoretical
approach is consistent with the associative network view of
memory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975)
and the description of an attitude as the association between
an attitude–object and a valence concept (Fazio, 1995; Fazio,
Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). Therefore, the IAT was
developed to measure the relative strength of automatic asso
ciation between concepts. For example, the first demonstra
tion of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) compared the rela
tive strength of the association between flowers versus
insects (the target concepts) and positive versus negative va
lence. Persons with a more favorable attitude toward flowers
than insects possessed a stronger automatic association of
“flower” with “positive” than of “insect” with “positive.” Be
sides its ability to measure relative favorableness, the IAT has
been shown to be a broader measure, for instance, in the mea
surement of the association between one’s concept of self
and other constructs (e.g., women possess stronger IAT-mea
sured associations between “me” and “feminine” than be
tween “me” and “masculine;” Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).
Modus Operandi
Based on computer-mediated response latency measurement
protocols, the IAT measure is computed by comparing the
relative response times associated with several categorization
tasks. Assume for purposes of illustration that you are an en
thusiastic New York Yankees fan who has a general distaste
for the New York Mets (two contrasted attitude–object con
cepts), and that our purpose is to gauge the relative strength
of the automatic association between yourself and the Yan
kees versus yourself and the Mets. For this task, we might use
two pairs of concepts: “Yankees” versus “Mets,” and “self”
versus “others.” For each of the four concepts, we identify a
series of words or pictures to use as exemplars. For example,
a photo of a Yankees uniform would be an exemplar of “Yan
kees,” whereas “me” would be an exemplar of “self.” In the
first category discrimination task, several exemplars of the
Yankees and Mets are randomly presented with instructions

to categorize each stimulus as representing either the cate
gory “Yankees” or “Mets” by pressing either a specific left or
right key on your computer keyboard. In the second discrimi
nation task, exemplars of “self” and “others” are randomly
presented with instructions to categorize them as represent
ing “self” or “others” by pressing the appropriate left or right
keys.
After completing several trials of these first two tasks, you
are asked to complete a new discrimination task where all
four categories are now combined. In this task, you are pre
sented with stimuli representing one of the four concepts
(“self,” “others,” “Yankees,” or “Mets”), and instructed to
press the left key if the stimulus exemplifies either the “self”
or “Yankees,” and the right key if the stimulus represents ei
ther the “others” or “Mets.” Thus, “Yankees” and “self” share
one response key, and the “Mets” and “others” share the
other key. Finally, after some additional practice trials to fa
miliarize yourself with new key assignments for one of the
categorization tasks (in this case, “Mets” vs. “Yankees”), you
perform a new combined categorization task in which the
categorization of “Mets” or “self” is done with the left key,
and the categorization of “Yankees” or “others” is done with
the right one. If you are a real Yankees fan and identify with
the team, you should find the first combined categorization to
be easier than the second one. You should also be faster at
classifying “Yankees” and “self” exemplars when both cate
gories share the same response key (and “Mets” and “others”
share the second response key) than when the key assign
ments are reversed. The difference between your average re
sponse time in the second combined task and your average

response time in the first combined task is the IAT effect. Its
magnitude and arithmetic sign can be interpreted as a mea
sure of the relative automatic association between yourself
and the Yankees, versus yourself and the Mets.
What Does or Can the IAT Measure?
As the use of the IAT develops, we must consider the scope of
the constructs that the measure can assess in psychology, and
in consumer research in particular. According to “A Unified
Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self Esteem, and
Self-Concept” (Greenwald et al., 2002), a person’s social
knowledge structure can be represented by an associative net
work of concepts and nodes, with social constructs conceptu
alized as sets of associations. Concepts can be persons, groups,
or attributes (including the positive and negative valence at
tributes). In a typical knowledge structure, the concept of self
is at the center and is connected to other social concepts
(Greenwald et al., 2002). The IAT provides valid measures of
implicit associations in this type of structure and affords data
that explicit measures cannot (Greenwald et al., 2002). Over
all, the IAT can provide implicit measures of automatic atti
tudes, self-concepts, self-esteems, and stereotypes.
It follows that the IAT can be used to measure implicit
consumption-related constructs in an associative consumer
social knowledge structure. Figure 1 represents a hypotheti
cal structure for a visual artist computer user. The consumer
is at the center of the structure; general (persons, groups, or
attributes) and positive–negative-valence concepts are in
cluded. The nodes depict concepts and the line thickness de-

FIGURE 1 Hypothetical consumer social knowledge structure for a computer consumer. The consumer is at the center; the attribute, person, and group
concepts are represented in the ovals. The positive and negative attribute valence concepts (two especially important attribute concepts) are represented
by the + and – sign rectangles. The thickness of the links between concepts represents the strength of the automatic association between concepts.

notes the strength of automatic concept associations. In this
example, the consumer has a positive attitude toward Apple
Computers based on positive associations with this concept
(direct and indirect positive associations). Also, because Ap
ple is directly linked to the concept of “self” and the associa
tion is strong, it can be assumed that there is a strong implicit
brand identification or relationship. The opposite is true for
the association with the competing brand, Microsoft, which
is unrelated to self and has a negative valence.
A consumer social knowledge structure can also incorpo
rate associations for brand image and brand personality. In
our example, Microsoft’s image is related to work (strong as
sociation) and computer viruses (weaker association) and
Apple is perceived to have a smart personality. From a prod
uct management perspective, a consumer knowledge struc
ture can capture implicit product perceptions and categoriza
tions and can depict associations between products (e.g.,
complementarity, compatibility, or substitutability). It can
also reflect associations between a consumer, a product, and
a peer group. Figure 1, for example, shows that this consumer
has a strong connection between Apple and her friends (in
particular, Simone). Finally, connections between Jeff
Goldblum (a strongly positively evaluated person in this
case), an ad that features him as an Apple spokesperson, and
the brand, could be a result of ad exposure and can show af
fect transfer (from the positive attitude toward the spokesper
son, to attitude toward the ad, to brand attitude) and advertis
ing effectiveness. Although Figure 1 does not provide an
exhaustive account of all the consumer behavior constructs
that might be found in a knowledge structure, it points out
that this representation is flexible and comprehensive. The
IAT provides a means to measure the relative strengths of the
automatic associations between constructs in the structure
(e.g., an assessment of implicit attitudes toward Apple versus
Microsoft).
Validity and Psychometric Issues
Despite its conceptual and theoretical relevance, the general
validity and reliability of the IAT must be assessed. Although
the IAT has received rapid and extensive support (Devine,
2001), several issues remain to be addressed (for reviews, see
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Fazio & Olson,
2003; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek,
2001; Kihlstrom, 2004). In this section, we consider several
specific issues and apply customary measurement criteria
(Netemeyer & Bearden, 1998) to the potential use of the IAT
in consumer research. Finally, unresolved issues about the
measurement technique are discussed.

Does the IAT correlate with explicit measures? A ba
sic question concerns the relation between an IAT-based
measure and its explicit counterpart. Ever since the early pre
sentation of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), researchers
have claimed that IAT and self-report measures capture dis

tinct but correlated constructs (Greenwald & Farnham,
2000). The constructs are typically related because of their
common antecedents. Although the correlation between ex
plicit measures and IAT is sometimes quite high (e.g., .69 in a
2000 presidential election IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald,
2002a), in other cases, it is low and not significant (Nosek &
Banaji, 2002).2 Still, the divergence of the constructs creates
the potential for implicit and explicit measures to comple
ment each other in predicting behavior (as observed by Maison et al., 2004).
It is nevertheless important to understand when IAT-based
measures will be more or less correlated with their explicit
counterparts. A review of empirical IAT findings suggests
that the correlation between explicit and IAT measures can be
limited by (a) response factors (e.g., inaccuracy in self-report
due to impression management for sensitive questions or the
type of object being assessed); (b) introspective factors (e.g.,
inaccuracy in self-reports because of respondents’ poor intro
spection of their own attitudes or limited attitude elabora
tion); and (c) a lack of variance with some attitudes which
can be homogeneous across a specific population (Green
wald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek & Banaji, 2002). The last argu
ment is statistical in nature and the first two point out psycho
logical factors. Consumer psychologists should consider
how these moderating factors could be applicable in a con
sumer domain, and future research should aim at providing
further empirical evidence of these effects and conditions.
Also related to this discussion are the issues of convergent
and discriminant validity. First, IAT measures converge with
semantic priming measures of association strength
(Cunningham et al., 2001; Mellott & Greenwald, 2000;
Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Second, confirmatory factor
analysis has shown discriminant validity of implicit and ex
plicit self-esteem and gender self-concept (Greenwald &
Farnham, 2000). In addition, physiological measures (func
tional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI) have shown
that IAT effects are linked to activation of the amygdala (a
subcortical structure associated with emotional learning and
evaluation) but not with other regions of the brain typically
involved in explicit processing (Cunningham et al., 2003,
Phelps et al., 2000). Evidence of this discriminant ability has
been demonstrated in research showing that (a) prejudice
against female job applicants was associated with IAT-as
sessed gender stereotypes, but not explicit gender stereotypes
measures (Rudman & Glick, 2001); or (b) even when impres
2A correlation of .5 or more should be seen as high. It approaches the
maximum value obtainable given the limitations imposed by unreliability of
the component measures. For example, in a latent variable analysis (e.g.,
confirmatory factory analysis), the disattenuated correlation between im
plicit and explicit measures of the types used in these studies might be on the
order of r = .7 (or even higher). In a setting of such purified measures, the
variance not accounted for by a hypothesized implicit–explicit latent vari
able correlation (of .7 in this example) should be understood as real differ
ences between the psychological constructs assessed by the two types of
measures.

sion management or inaccessibility are not a concern, IAT
measures of attitude can explain variance in consumption be
havior over and above that accounted for by explicit mea
sures (Maison et al., 2004).

Is the IAT reliable? Test–retest reliabilities of the IAT
average about .60 (Greenwald et al., 2002) and IAT measures
have high internal consistency (alpha about equal to .80 and
often higher; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Also, the measure
is resistant to several types of procedural artifacts. Spe
cifically, the IAT effect is independent of (a) which hand is
assigned to the pleasant category; (b) variability in the num
ber of items used to represent categories; (c) the familiarity of
the items used to represent categories (except for items with
extremely low familiarity levels; Brendl, Markman, &
Messner, 2001; Greenwald & Nosek; Rothermund &
Wentura, 2001); (d) variability in the response–stimulus in
terval; and (e) the order of the mixed categorization tasks (as
long as there is counterbalancing of the order in the study;
Greenwald & Nosek). In addition, IAT effects have limited
sensitivity to differences in how incorrect responses and
nonnormal response latency distributions are treated (Green
wald & Nosek).
Is the IAT sensitive to context effects? Based on a
review of IAT research, Greenwald and Farnham (2000) con
cluded that “IAT measures can be influenced in theoretically
expected fashion by procedures that might be expected to in
fluence automatic attitudes or stereotypes” (p. 1023). For ex
ample, viewing photos of admirable members of stigmatized
groups and despised members of nonstigmatized groups re
duced implicit negative attitudes toward the stigmatized
groups (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2000). Consequently, this
sensitivity to situational and contextual manipulations re
quires further elaboration and explanation.
A special section of the November 2001 issue of the Jour
nal of Personality and Social Psychology has explored these
malleability and invariance issues. Although the implications
of these articles are not unequivocal, they converge on the
conclusion that the IAT should not be regarded as measuring
a construct that is permanent or fixed (Devine, 2001). The
IAT’s susceptibility to these effects is not an indication of its
failure to measure “stable” opinions. Indeed, because of its
responsiveness to research manipulations, the IAT can be
useful as a dependent measure, and it can be used to deter
mine whether associations among specified concepts are
consistent with theory. Besides, the IAT is less sensitive to in
structions to fake than are explicit measures (Asendorpf,
Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001).
An explanation for the IAT responsiveness to contextual
manipulations is that social concepts like male, female, Afri
can American, White, Asian, young., old, and so forth, exist
not only as memory prototypes, but also as subtypes that may
be different in valence from the prototypes. This is consistent
with a multiple-systems view of memory where multiple bins

encompass separate knowledge structures in long-term
memory (Wyer & Srull, 1989). The effect of a manipulation
may be to activate a specific subtype (rather than the default
prototype), which may then represent the larger category in
the IAT. Certainly this explanation is consistent with the re
sults obtained by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2000) that were
discussed earlier. Further, respondents might not be aware of
the factors that lead to the activation of a particular knowl
edge structure. Ultimately, future research on the specific
theoretical underpinnings and processes of the IAT should
provide greater understanding of this overall issue.

Does the IAT measure unconscious processes? Most
generally, the IAT is assumed to measure association
strengths. These association strengths can be given more spe
cific interpretations, depending on the person’s introspective
access to them and the person’s willingness to report them, as
demonstrated by Greenwald et al. (2002) and Greenwald and
Nosek (2001). If the association strengths are ones to which
the person does not have introspective access, they can be
called unconscious associations. It is also entirely possible
that the person has access to them but prefers not to report
them, in which case the IAT is measuring conscious associa
tion strengths that people do not wish to make public. Finally,
when self-reported and IAT-measured associations agree, the
question as to whether the IAT is measuring something con
scious becomes inappropriate—the alternatives are not mu
tually exclusive.
A recent study by Forehand and Perkins (2003) provides
evidence that the IAT can measure associations that occur
outside of conscious awareness. They showed that the voice
of a celebrity endorser only had a positive effect on implicit
(IAT-based) attitudes toward the endorsed brand when the
listener did not recognize the celebrity’s voice in the radio ad
(i.e., under unawareness condition). In this absence of con
scious recognition (even on a cue–recall task), Forehand and
Perkins made a case that the effect observed is due to an un
conscious transfer of the spokesperson attitude to the brand
attitude. When recognition was present, listeners became
aware of the endorser’s influence on their attitude, and cogni
tive responses (e.g., critical evaluation of the endorsement,
evaluation of the match with the brand, counterargu
mentation, etc.) eliminated the endorser effect. This interac
tion effect with recognition, in conjunction with theoretical
considerations, allows researchers to claim that associations
were unconscious. Based on evidence from research in psy
chology and these recent findings in marketing, it is apparent
that the IAT can be a measure of implicit consumer social
cognition as well as an implicit measure of consumer social
cognition.
Is the IAT sensitive enough to individual-level differ
ences? The IAT can detect effects that are considered uni
versal (e.g., preferences for flowers over insects; Greenwald
et al., 1998), but also differences that vary between partici

pant populations. For instance, the IAT has identified differ
ences between Japanese and Korean Americans’ preferences
for their own versus others’ ethnicities (Greenwald et al.,
1998), between East and West Germans’ implicit attitudes to
ward their geographical regions (Kuehnen et al., 2001), and
between men and women in both their implicit gender
self-concepts (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and their atti
tudes toward mathematics and the arts (Nosek, Banaji, &
Greenwald, 2002b).

Are there pitfalls involved in stimulus selection? A
primary consideration in selecting stimuli is that they be rea
sonably familiar (although the IAT effect is robust across rel
atively wide variations in item familiarity), and unambigu
ously fall into one of two categories (e.g., pleasant vs.
unpleasant, Nike vs. Reebok; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).
The stimuli that are used to represent the various concepts
and attributes in the IAT are either drawn from established
category lists in the literature (e.g., Battig & Montague,
1969; Bellezza, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1986) or are selected
on the basis of consensual familiarity and ability to be cate
gorized easily and consistently. Both words and pictures can
be used for target-concept or attribute dimensions.
A question arises as to whether the IAT measures associa
tions at the category level or at the level of individual exem
plars. Previous research supports the first possibility (De
Houwer, 2001; Steffens & Plewe, 2001). For example, Brit
ish participants’ answers to an IAT in which they were to cat
egorize names of celebrities as either British or foreign were
not affected by the affective evaluations of the exemplars
used for the British (e.g., Princess Diana versus a notorious
British person who was murdered) or foreign (e.g., Hitler
versus Einstein) categories (De Houwer, 2001).
Unresolved Concerns and Limitations
The aforementioned discussion of the IAT has focused pri
marily on supporting evidence. A consideration of its limita
tions should be noted, however, in the context of assessing its
potential usefulness for consumer research. First, the IAT
only measures the relative strength of association. For exam
ple, it assesses the relative favorableness of a respondent’s at
titudes toward the two target objects being compared but not
their absolute favorableness. Thus, a favorable IAT toward
concept “A” versus “B” implies that “A” is preferred to “B.”
Yet, this could be true either because (a) the respondent likes
“A” but is neutral toward “B,” or because (b) the respondent
is neutral toward “A” but dislikes “B.” To this extent, the IAT
assesses a comparative attitude (i.e., an implicit preference)
rather than an attitude toward a single object.
One way to avoid this problem might involve a triangula
tion of the IAT effects with a known neutral or extremely po
larized category, thereby disaggregating the relative prefer
ence in more absolute terms. Also, more direct approaches
have been proposed. Methods derived from the IAT have

been developed for single concepts, such as the Go/No-go
Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Although this is a
promising measure, it is still in the early stages of develop
ment and application, may not be as adaptive to the range of
associations that the IAT can measure, and its psychometric
properties are not yet as well reported as those for the IAT.
Likewise, priming measures do not have the IAT’s limitation
of being a relative measure. For example, relative to a neutral
baseline that might be provided by the absence of a prime (or
use of a presumably neutral prime), faster responding to posi
tive targets in the presence of a prime indicates that the prime
is more strongly associated with positive than with negative
evaluation. In addition, the priming procedure may allow the
assessment of evaluative associations of individual words,
whereas the IAT assesses evaluations at the level of the cate
gory to which a group of words belongs. However, as dis
cussed earlier, priming measures have relatively inferior
psychometric properties.
The IAT might not be a very efficient measure if one is in
terested in concepts that can be measured explicitly. There is
little justification for the use of a complex procedure if a sim
ilar outcome can be obtained through a questionnaire. The
IAT will be especially useful in situations in which it can pre
dict variations in consumer behavior beyond those explained
by parallel explicit measures.
Other criticisms have been levied against the IAT. Some
have suggested that response patterns from the IAT may be
confounded with other factors such as a person’s cognitive
ability (McFarland & Crouch, 2002) or respondents’ shift in
response criterion during the difficult or incompatible mixed
block of the test (e.g., “insects” with “pleasant;” Brendl et al.,
2001). Brendl et al. argued that the difficulty of the classifica
tion task (rather than just the underlying attitude) might con
found IAT findings in some situations. Others have argued
that the IAT might also capture an attitude object’s environ
mental or cultural associations instead of just one’s evalua
tion of the object (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Finally, it is
worth noting that advances in the development of the IAT
have been driven largely by a concern with measurement is
sues. A stronger theoretical model of the components of IAT
effects is necessary to understand better how the IAT mea
sures association strength and whether it captures more than
association strength.
Summary
Earlier in the article, we argued that consumer psychologists
would benefit from implicit measures that display conver
gent validity, are sensitive to individual differences, and are
insensitive to image management and attitude accessibility
differences. The IAT is not a “finished” product and there are
still some psychometric, validity, or procedural questions
that future research should address. Based on this evidence,
however, the IAT satisfies the aforementioned measurement
criteria and possesses properties that are superior to priming

techniques (e.g., superior test–retest reliability and greater
sensitivity to individual differences). Further the IAT should
be superior when predictions are at the category level,
whereas priming may offer some benefits at the exemplar
level (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The next step is to provide direct
empirical support for its validity and value in consumer re
search.

RESEARCH SYNOPSIS
In the empirical section of this article, we use the IAT to mea
sure consumer-related constructs (e.g., brand attitudes, brand
relationships, and attitudes toward an ad). As previously dis
cussed, attitudes can be represented as the association be
tween an attitude object and a valence attribute concept
(Greenwald et al., 2002). In addition to evaluative assess
ments, consumers can also have deep relationships with a
brand, with the brand becoming part of a person’s self-con
cept (Belk, 1988; Fournier, 1998; Kleine, Kleine, & Allen,
1995). Study 1 tests the validity and usefulness of the IAT for
measuring these constructs across two real brands. In Study
2, the IAT is used to capture implicit Aad by measuring the
relative strength of the association between advertisements
with spokespeople of different ethnicities and the valence at
tribute concepts (pleasant vs. unpleasant). Although Study 1
demonstrates the convergent validity of the IAT in a con
sumer setting, Study 2 shows that the IAT can also reveal dis
sociations between explicit and implicit consumer social
cognition. In a follow-up study, we also eliminate alternative
explanations for our results and demonstrate that the IAT ef
fect is derived from consumers’ relative evaluations of the
categories, and not the exemplars used to operationalize the
categories.

STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to test the efficacy of the IAT as a mea
sure of brand attitudes and brand relationship strength. To do
so, we chose a topic where implicit and explicit attitudes
were expected to converge. Computer platforms (more spe
cifically, Macintosh [Mac] and Microsoft Windows-based
[PC] machines) were chosen as the focal targets. We did not
expect significant differences between explicit and implicit
attitudes because consumers are likely to know their attitudes
toward the target and to lack the motivation to disguise them.
This study was also designed to test the IAT’s utility in mea
suring consumer–brand relationships (i.e., the degree to
which a brand is part of a consumer’s self-concept). In this re
gard, we expected that Mac users would have a stronger rela
tionship with their preferred brand than would PC users, as
they often see themselves as part of a close community of us
ers who have strong ties to the product (Muniz & O’Guinn,
2001).

Method

Procedure and design. Eighty-eight introductory psy
chology students participated in the study on a voluntary ba
sis for extra course credit. For each participant, data were col
lected in two locations (a common room where pa
per-and-pencil questionnaires were administered and four
individual rooms where the IAT measures were adminis
tered). Fifty-six students participated and provided data that
could be matched across the two parts of the study. In the first
half of the study, participants completed a three-page survey
with demographic, vision, and computer proficiency ques
tions, explicit measures of Mac versus PC attitudes, com
puter ownership, and usage frequency. Prior research has
demonstrated that the order of implicit versus explicit mea
sures has inconsequential effects on the results (Greenwald
& Farnham, 2000). We nevertheless selected the most con
servative option and captured the explicit measures first be
cause the IAT is less likely than explicit measures to be influ
enced by prior measures.
In the second half of the study, participants completed two
IATs in counterbalanced order. One IAT, which consisted of
the stimulus sequence shown in Figure 2, measured implicit
attitudes by using stimuli representing Mac and PC comput
ers (the target concepts) and pleasant and unpleasant words.
The other IAT measured implicit brand relationships by pair
ing the Mac and PC-related stimuli with words representing
the concepts “self” and “other” rather than pleasantness-re
lated words. Self-related words included “I,” “me,” “my,” and
“mine;” other-related words included “they,” “them,” “their,”
and “other.”
The first IAT we administered consisted of 7 blocks with
32 trials during the practice blocks and 40 trials during the
measured blocks. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a
single stimulus item. The second IAT only required six
blocks (the block in Step 1 of Figure 2 was unnecessary for
the second IAT as the Mac versus PC categorization had al
ready been practiced and the key assignments remained un
changed for each participant). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight counterbalanced task orders to ac
commodate three procedural factors (i.e., a 2 × 2 × 2 design):
whether the brand attitude or brand relationship IAT was ad
ministered first, whether pleasant or unpleasant were initially
assigned to the left or right key (in other words, presentation
order of the favorable versus unfavorable attitude), and
whether self or other were initially assigned to the left or
right key.
Measures. During the IAT, the computer recorded
participants’ response latencies (in milliseconds) for the
two measured blocks. Trial number, block, stimuli informa
tion, and error rates were also recorded. Consistent with
prior procedures and recommended guidelines established
for the IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald et
al., 1998), the first two trials in the measured blocks were

FIGURE 2 Schematic description of the Implicit Attitude Test (IAT; adapted from Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The correct response for each sample
stimulus is indicated by a check mark. The IAT effect is calculated as the difference in average response latencies between the two measurement blocks in
steps 3 and 5. Complete stimuli included six words for each of the pleasant and unpleasant categories, and five words or pictures for each of the Ap
ple/Macintosh and PC-type/IBM categories.

dropped because they are typically longer; latencies longer
than 3,000 msec were recoded to 3,000 msec, and latencies
shorter than 300 msec were recoded as 300 msec. After the
data transformations, the IAT effect was calculated as the
difference in average response latencies between the third
and fifth step depicted in Figure 2. A pro-Mac implicit atti
tude effect occurred when a participant was quicker to cate
gorize a stimulus when Mac and pleasant shared the same
response key compared to when Mac and unpleasant shared
the same key. A self-Mac implicit brand relationship effect
occurred when a participant was quicker to categorize Mac
and self together compared to Mac and other. Higher scores
on the IAT effects described in this study indicate more fa
vorable implicit attitude and brand relationship toward Mac
relative to PC.
Explicit attitudes toward Mac and PC were measured in
the survey along a 5-item, 7-point semantic differential scale,
anchored by good–bad, pleasant–unpleasant, inferior–supe
rior, unsatisfactory–satisfactory, and favorable–unfavorable
(α = .90 for both Mac and PC scales). Two ownership mea
sures (Mac and PC) asked participants to indicate how many
computers of each type they owned. For each brand, usage
frequency was measured with 9-point semantic differential
scales anchored by not at all–very frequently. Participants’
scores on the explicit attitude, ownership, and usage mea
sures for PC were subtracted from their Mac scores to gener
ate a relative measure of Mac versus PC tendencies. Consis
tent with the IAT effect, higher scores on these measures
indicated a greater preference for Mac versus PC.

Results
Initial analyses tested the effects of the three counterbalanc
ing factors (e.g., order of the two IATs). None of these factors
had a significant effect on the IAT results. These null findings
are consistent with prior studies using the IAT demonstrating
the robustness of the IAT across several procedural variations
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). There
fore, the analysis that follows is collapsed across the eight
procedural conditions.

A primary concern of this study is the degree to which the
explicit measures of brand attitudes, ownership, and usage
were correlated with IAT-based measures of implicit brand
attitudes and brand relationship. Table 1 illustrates that all of
the explicit difference measures were significantly positively
correlated with the IAT-based measures. Thus, under condi
tions in which participants were not expected to hide their be
liefs, explicit brand attitudes were strongly correlated to im
plicit attitudes (r = .50, p < .01) and implicit brand
relationship (r = .54, p < .01), thereby validating the IAT for
brand evaluation. Further, both IAT-based and explicit brand
attitudes were also strongly correlated (r = .69 for both cases)
with explicit usage measures.

Individual differences in attitude. Additional analy
sis was conducted to investigate differences in IAT-based
measures between pro-Mac and pro-PC respondents. To do
this, the explicit difference scores for attitude, ownership,
and usage were dummy-coded. Participants who had re
ported more favorable Mac explicit attitudes, ownership, or
usage were assigned a 1, whereas those who had reported
more favorable reactions to PC-related measures were as
signed a 0. Participants who were indifferent (that is, whose
scores on the attitude, ownership, and usage measures were
the same for PCs and Macs) were excluded from this analy
sis. This eliminated 11.4%, 20.3%, and 5.6% of the partici
pants who reported equivalent attitudes, ownership, and us
age, respectively (note, however, that only the size and not
the direction of the effects changes if the ambivalent respon
dents are also kept in the analysis).
Participants who reported more favorable explicit atti
tudes, greater ownership, or usage frequencies for a brand
had significantly faster response latencies when the brand
was paired with “pleasant” versus “unpleasant,” thereby
yielding consistency between the implicit and explicit con
structs. The difference was statistically significant in all six
comparisons (see Figure 3). Thus, implicit brand attitudes
were correlated with explicit brand preferences but also were
sensitive to individual behavioral differences. Further, a
comparison of implicit attitude effects for PC versus Mac

TABLE 1
Correlations Among Key Variables—Study 1

Implicit Attitude

Implicit Brand
Relationship

Explicit Brand
Attitude
(Difference Score)

Computer
Ownership
(Difference Score)

Pearson Correlation

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Implicit brand relationship
Explicit brand attitude (difference score)
Computer ownership (difference score)
Computer usage

63
54
54
50

.542**
.504**
.468**
.688**

54
54
50

.307*
.411**
.543**

79
72

.581**
.692**

72

.689**

Note. High scores on the Implicit Association Test and the explicit difference scores indicate preferences for Macintosh relative to Microsoft Win
dows-based PC-type computers.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

FIGURE 3

Implicit attitude and implicit brand relationship results by explicit attitude, ownership, and usage frequency—Study 1.

loyalists yielded stronger IAT effects for the Mac groups than
the PC groups. Whether the data were split by prior attitude,
ownership, or usage, the average IAT effect for the Mac loy
alists ranged from 130.28 to 158.8 msec, but ranged only
from 54.78 to 69.46 msec for the PC group (t > 4.18, p < .001,
for all three comparisons). These results indicate that attitude
strength and accessibility were consistently greater for Mac
loyalists than for PC loyalists.

Individual differences in brand relationships. A sig
nificant IAT brand relationship effect was only evident for
the Mac loyalists, M = 121.1, t(16) = 2.93, p = .01, for explicit
attitude; M = 157.3, t(13) = 3.10, p < .01 for ownership; M =
178.6, t(16) = 4.36, p < .001, for usage; see Figure 3). Partici
pants who reported more favorable explicit attitudes, greater
ownership, or usage frequencies for Mac had significantly
faster response when Mac and self were combined as op
posed to Mac and other. Conversely, PC loyalists’ response
latencies when PC and other were combined as opposed to
PC and self were not different (t values ranging from .36 to
.76). Further, a comparison of implicit brand relationships for
PC versus Mac loyalists confirmed stronger IAT effects for
the Mac groups than the PC groups. Whether the data was
split by prior attitudes, ownership, or usage, t tests confirmed
higher IAT effect for the Mac group than for the PC group (t >
3.25, p < .005, for all three comparisons). Together, these re
sults suggest that owning a Mac is closely related to one’s im
plicit identity whereas owning a PC is not.

Discussion
This study demonstrates the validity of the IAT as an instru
ment for measuring implicit brand attitudes and brand rela
tionships. First, in a situation where implicit and explicit con
structs would be expected to converge, IAT measures of
brand attitude and brand relationship were strongly corre
lated with explicit measures of brand attitude, ownership,
and usage. Furthermore, IAT measures effectively differenti
ated consumers who reported more favorable explicit atti
tude, ownership, and usage of one brand versus the other.
Second, the measurement benefits of the IAT are particularly
compelling with respect to brand relationships. In Fournier’s
(1998) terms, Mac users appeared to have a stronger
self-connection to the brand than did PC users. The strong
Mac brand relationship might stem from the resistance and
loyalty that Mac users have developed after years of being a
small share in the computer world (Wong, 2001) and the
strong sense of brand community exhibited by Mac users
(Muniz & O’Guinn, 2001). Because of their minority status,
Mac users may hold “a socially embedded and entrenched
loyalty, brand commitment… and even hyper loyalty”
(Muniz & O’Guinn, p. 427). The IAT results also confirm
that brands “serve as powerful repositories of meaning pur
posively and differently employed in the substantiation, cre

ation, and (re)production of concepts of self in the marketing
age” (Fournier, p. 365).

STUDY 2
The previous study showed that IAT-based measures of brand
attitudes and relationships are correlated with explicit mea
sures when consumers have access to their attitudes and are
willing to share them. This validation of the IAT in a market
ing context was a necessary step in establishing that the IAT
is a valid marketing measure. This step is also imperative if
one is to show that under other conditions, there can be disso
ciations (i.e., no significant correlations) between explicit
marketing attitude measures and corresponding IAT mea
sures. Study 2 provides this demonstration, showing that the
IAT can uncover consumers’ attitudes that traditional mea
sures do not detect. In doing so, it demonstrates that explicit
measures can lead to erroneous conclusions if implicit mea
sures are not considered.
In this study, we investigated the topic of the race of adver
tising spokespeople. Past IAT research has shown that the IAT
reveals racial biases that explicit measures do not detect
(Dasgupta & McGhee, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998). Also,
there is an extensive body of research dealing with the impact
of spokespeople on ad persuasion (e.g., Deshpande &
Stayman, 1994; Heath, McCarthy, & Mothersbaugh, 1994;
Kamins, 1990). This latter research, however, has been based
on explicit measures (c.f. Forehand & Perkins, 2003, for an ex
ception). In Study 2, we focus on attitudes toward the ad (Aad;
see Brown & Stayman, 1992, and Mitchell & Olson, 1981, for
reviews on this topic) and show that the IAT can detect negative
racially biased Aad evaluations for respondents that provide
socially acceptable answers in explicit measures.
Method

Procedure and design. Ninety-three undergraduate
students studying introductory business statistics (consisting
of 33 men: 46 Whites, 30 Asians, 6 Hispanics, 6 African
Americans, 5 multiracial or other ethnicities; median age =
19), participated in the study for course credit. Data for each
participant were collected during a single experimental ses
sion lasting under 45 min. As before, explicit measures were
collected first. Participants completed a survey containing
demographic, vision, and computer proficiency questions.
Subsequent analysis showed that all participants could be re
tained in the sample. The survey also included measures of
the key construct of interest—attitude toward the ad (5-item
scale)—both for ads with White spokespeople and ads with
Black spokespeople. Measurement order was counterbal
anced, so that half of the participants reported their attitudes
toward ads that featured White spokespeople first and the
other half reported attitude toward ads with Black
spokespersons first. Participants were randomly assigned to

one of the orders. Then, participants completed a 7-block
computer-based IAT. Blocks 4 and 7 were the measurement
blocks (counterbalanced as well). Each block consisted of 32
(practice) and 40 (measured) trials each. In addition to trial
number, block number, and stimuli information (see the Ap
pendix for examples of the stimuli), participants’ response la
tencies (in milliseconds) and error rates were recorded.

Stimuli. For this study, we developed 32 ads. These ads
had a simple layout to allow for quick processing and classi
fication. They consisted of an athlete’s picture (male or fe
male) and a brand identifier (name or logo). Based on a brand
familiarity pretest for 20 brands and with participants from
the same target population, ads were designed for two differ
ent athletics footwear brands: an unfamiliar brand—Etonic
(no participants reported owning Etonic shoes and the brand
received a 6.72 familiarity rating—where 1 = very familiar
and 9 = very unfamiliar) and a familiar brand—New Balance
(35% of participants reported owning a pair of New Balance
shoes, and they gave the brand a 2.70 familiarity rating on the
same scale). We purposely avoided using “megabrands” such
as Nike, Addidas, or Reebok. Sports were varied, and in
cluded tennis, basketball, track, golf, and bodybuilding. Four
ads were constructed for each sport: one with a White athlete
and a matching one with a Black athlete (none were celebri
ties), for each of the two brands (32 ads in total: 8 sports × 2
races × 2 brands). Efforts were made to insure that the Black
and White race versions of the ads matched each other (see
the Appendix for stimuli examples—faces of the models are
masked in this appendix, but were visible to the respondents).
To minimize differences across ads, they were displayed in
black and white mode. This study used the same list of pleas
ant and unpleasant words that were used in Study 1.
Measures. Explicit measures of Aad were collected
for both ads with White spokespersons and ads with Black
spokespersons. This was done using a 6-item semantic differ
ential scale (interesting–boring, good–bad, pleasant–un
pleasant, like–dislike, favorable–not favorable, irritating–not
irritating). These items have been used in past research on
Aad (MacKenzie & Lutz, 1996; MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch,
1986; Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell & Olson, 1981). Scale reli
ability was high: α (Black) = .93; α (White) = .88. An explicit
Aad preference was created by taking the difference in score
between Aad White minus Aad Black.
Implicit Aad was measured using a similar methodology
to Study 1. In this study, the IAT effect was measured as the
difference in average response latencies in the blocks when
the classification target category (ad with a Black spokesper
son versus ad with a White spokesperson) shared the same re
sponse key as the attribute concept (“unpleasant” vs. “pleas
ant”). Thus, a pro-White spokesperson implicit Aad effect
occurred when a participant was quicker to categorize stimuli
when ads with a White spokesperson shared the same re

sponse key with “pleasant” than when they shared the same
key with “unpleasant.”
Results
Explicit and implicit attitudes toward the ads are shown in
Figure 4. As expected, there were no significant differences
between explicit attitudes toward ads with White
spokespersons, M = 4.67, compared to ads with Black
spokespersons, M = 4.77, t(92) = –1.32, ns (see Figure 4),
suggesting that at the explicit level, participants did not ex
hibit racial preferences. However, implicit measures of Aad
revealed a strong preference for ads containing White
spokespersons: IAT effect, M = 244.53 msec, t(92) = 11.25, p
< .001. Also, the implicit and explicit measures of ad prefer
ences were not significantly correlated (r = .135, p > .3). This
dissociation between the implicit and explicit results is fur
ther confirmed by a significant interaction of race of the
spokesperson and measurement method in an analysis of
standardized attitude scores, F(1, 92) = 146.93, p < .001.
In this subsequent analysis, we considered responses from
White and Black participant subgroups. As shown in Figure
5, the subgroups exhibited divergent results. White respon
dents exhibited a significant “pro-White” IAT preference, M
= 255.70 msec, t(45) = 14.99, p < .001, but no significant ex
plicit preference. The Black group indicated preferring ads
with Black spokespersons at the explicit level, M = 0.75, t(5)
= 3.40, p < .05, but no significant implicit preference. Fur
ther, the IAT preference for ads with White spokespersons
was significantly greater for White respondents, M = 255.70
msec, than for Black respondents, M = 22.92 msec, F(1, 50)
= 9.85, p < .005; whereas the explicit preference for ads with
Black spokespersons was significantly greater for Black re
spondents, M = 0.78, than for White respondents, M = 0.01,
F(1, 50) = 7.11, p < .01.
Further analysis confirmed that there was a significant in
teraction of ethnicity and measurement method on the re
vealed preference for “ads with spokespersons of one’s own

FIGURE 4 Overall explicit and implicit attitudes toward the
ad—Study 2.

FIGURE 6 Standardized preferences for ads with spokespersons
from own ethnicity as a function of respondent ethnicity and mea
surement method—Study 2. A positive number indicates a prefer
ence for ads with spokespersons from one’s own ethnic group. Zero
indicates equal preference for ads with White or Black
spokespersons. A negative number indicates preference for ads with
spokespersons from the opposite ethnic group.

FIGURE 5 Explicit and implicit attitudes toward the ad as a func
tion of respondent ethnicity—Study 2.

ethnicity,” F(1, 50) = 21.96, p < .001. The results depicted in
Figure 6 are based on standardized scores to account for the
unit difference between the two measures. The findings show
that White respondents did not acknowledge an explicit pref
erence (M = –0.02), but implicitly preferred their in-group
(M = 1.38). Conversely, Black respondents revealed an
in-group preference at the explicit level (M = 1.11) but not at
the implicit level (M = –0.12).

Follow-Up Study
To further probe the validity of Study 2 results, we conducted
supplemental data analysis and collected additional data in a
follow-up experiment. Our main goal was to assess the extent
to which our results might have been influenced by the stim
uli used. We first conducted an additional analysis of the
aforementioned results to show that brand effects did not
confound the findings. We compared the average latencies
for classification of the brand stimuli (excluding the pleas
ant–unpleasant stimuli) and found that there was no brand ef
fect on implicit Aad, F(1, 185) < 1. Although this null result
is noteworthy, it is important to show that the absence of
brand effect was driven by the task (i.e., the respondents were

focused on the race of the spokesperson classification task)
rather than by an overall absence of brand preference.
We therefore designed a follow-up IAT experiment using
the same stimuli as before, but asked new participants to clas
sify the ads based on the brand (Etonic vs. New Balance).
Fifty-four respondents from the same participant pool partic
ipated. They matched the first sample in terms of demo
graphics. The IAT effect was significant, M = 125.52 msec,
t(53) = 5.45, p < .001, showing an overall preference for New
Balance over Etonic. However, the IAT effect was not contin
gent on the race of the spokesperson, F(1, 107) < 1.
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated the validity of the IAT as a measure of
implicit brand attitudes and brand relationships, showed cor
relations with explicit measures, and established its individ
ual level sensitivity. Conversely, Study 2 showed that the IAT
is also a useful measurement for testing effects that explicit
measures do not uncover. In this regard, explicit measures of
Aad may have reflected views that participants wished to
present (i.e., a potential distortion to avoid violating social
norms; see Demo, 1985; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992), whereas
the implicit measures reflected more uncontrollable auto
matic associations. For example, White respondents evi
denced an implicit preference for ads with White
spokespersons, suggesting that the absence of difference at
the explicit level can stem from a desire for social correct
ness.
Also, the Black group showed a lack of implicit in-group
preference, in a manner consistent with System Justification
Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This theory predicts that low
status groups are more likely to internalize and accept their
condition and this can lead to in-group devaluation. Although
not always measurable explicitly, this phenomenon is more
likely to be picked up by implicit measures like the IAT
(Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). In Study 2, Black re

spondents showed a favorable explicit Aad for ads featuring
their in-group, yet they also displayed an automatic response
with no positivism for their in-group. This devaluation of
one’s in-group increases as the status of the minority group
decreases so that the lower the status of a minority group, the
lesser the automatic preference for one’s in-group (Rudman
et al., 2002). In the case of very low status groups, this im
plicit acceptance of social prejudice can even lead to more fa
vorable associations with the out-group (Rudman et al.,
2002). We would not expect Black students at a major univer
sity to display such an extreme in-group bias. It is nonethe
less striking that their automatic associations suggested a
lack of preference for their own group.
Finally, the supplementary data obtained in this study con
firm the assumption that the IAT operates at the category level
as suggested by previous research, and that evaluations of spe
cific stimulus exemplars (e.g., liking New Balance) have no
detectable effects when the classification task refers to the race
of the spokesperson, and vice-versa. This is particularly help
ful if one is concerned with isolating the associations for one
concept, as it appears that as long as the categorization is clear,
results should be resilient to exemplar level effects.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this article, we have reviewed the strengths and limitations
of the IAT as a metric for investigating implicit consumer so
cial cognition. In addition, we provided an empirical examina
tion of the IAT’s validity and individual-level sensitivity in the
implicit measurement of brand attitude, consumer–brand rela
tionship strength, and attitude toward the advertisement (Aad).
Finally, we showed that the IAT is able to detect consumer be
havior effects that explicit measures could not. Our review of
the literature and two studies permits several conclusions.
First, explicit measures and IAT measures of attitudes and
other marketing constructs converge when consumers are
willing and able to report their feelings and beliefs. This con
vergence was clearly evident in Study 1, where social desir
ability or other biases were not likely to occur. However,
IAT-based measures of brand relationship strength revealed
distinctive asymmetries between brands, demonstrating that
the IAT can measure other constructs besides attitudes. Study
1 also showed that the IAT was sensitive to individual differ
ences in attitude accessibility and strength.
Second, the IAT can also capture automatic associations
between target concepts and attribute dimensions that are
distinct from explicit measures. In Study 2, IAT-based mea
sures of Aad revealed an influence of ethnic preference on
Aad that explicit measures did not. These findings under
score the potential utility of the IAT in gaining a better under
standing of the impact of ethnic stereotypes on advertising
and brand attitudes.
As discussed earlier, research on the role of unconscious
processes in consumer learning seems to be a logical candidate

to benefit from the IAT in the near term. Research on Aad for
mation, mere exposure effects, and classical conditioning
(e.g., Janiszewski, 1988), could also use the IAT to determine
if automatic or implicit associations between brands, ads, and
attribute dimensions, behave as would be expected by these
theories. Instead of relying on a lack of recall or other con
scious processes as evidence that preconscious activities are
present, the IAT can allow researchers to tap directly into the
implicit associations that are presumed to occur.
Unconscious and automatic processes should also be con
sidered in other consumer behavior domains. The IAT could
provide valuable measures of controversial or stigmatized top
ics. Past research investigating the impact of stigmas associ
ated with volunteerism (Snyder, Omoto, & Crain, 1999) has
shown that the public stigmatizes people who engage in so
cially beneficial activities such as volunteering to help some
one with AIDS. The IAT could potentially be used to expose
the associations that drive these perceptions, such as an associ
ation between AIDS and homosexuals, drug users, and other
stigmatized groups. Similarly, the IAT could be used to investi
gate how negative events that involve spokespeople can im
pact attitudes toward the spokespeople and the brands they
represent (Louie, Kulik, & Jacobson, 2001). In both cases, the
IAT might uncover the automatic associations between atti
tude objects and stigmatized attributes.
Our results can be linked to other research on race and eth
nicity in marketing. For example, research on consumer dis
tinctiveness and ethnic self-awareness (Forehand &
Deshpande, 2001; Grier & Deshpande, 2001) has examined
the effect of spokesperson ethnicity and other ethnic primes on
brand attitudes and persuasion. This research has discussed
the presence of “unconscious ethnic processing and categori
zation” (Forehand & Deshpande, p. 338). Therefore, it seems
that IAT-based measures of implicit ethnic stereotypes, Aads,
and brand attitudes, could allow further advances in this area.
Certainly it is not our intent to suggest that because the IAT
showed that White respondents had “pro-White” implicit atti
tudes, marketers should avoid using minorities in their ads. In
deed, marketing has long recognized the value of Michael Jor
dan, Tiger Woods, or the Williams sisters as spokespeople.
However, greater understanding of the role of unconscious
ethnic processing (across ethnic groups) and its link to explicit
components is needed. The IAT could provide evidence that
even when explicit measures suggest that racial or other biases
do not exist, consumers may hold strong stereotypes, and these
situations might need special attention, educational efforts, or
other interventions.
Aside from race, one could use of the IAT to better under
stand implicit attitudes toward risky behaviors (e.g., smok
ing, drinking, condom use) because political correctness and
social desirability might tend to influence explicit answers on
these issues. Similarly, the IAT can be useful to study reac
tions to companies’ social responsibility programs, and help
better predict when and how “doing good will also do well”
for the company (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001).

Results from Study 1 demonstrate the IAT’s usefulness for
measuring the degree to which brands are a part of a con
sumer’s self-concept. These findings demonstrate the IAT’s
potential for advancing research concerning brand relation
ships (Fournier, 1998), brand community (McAlexander,
Schouten, & Koenig, 2002; Muniz & O’Guinn, 2001), and
consumer identity. The IAT is also applicable to research on
organizational identification (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000) and
would allow for new understanding and measures of the over
lap between self-definition and organizational identity and
new insights on its likely impact on other marketing variables.
The IAT may provide unique and important information
on other topics in brand management as well. Consumers’ as
sociative brand networks may include concepts and associa
tions that a consumer either cannot or will not report, but
which may surface through the IAT. Further, because a suc
cessful brand extension or brand alliance would share at least
some of the traits associated with the core brand (Simonin &
Ruth, 1998), the IAT may expand our understanding of this
transfer process.
Ultimately, we would like to suggest that the IAT be used not
just as a dependent measure, but also as an independent one or
in conjunction with others. Much insight could come from us
ing the IAT as an explanatory factor for behavior, choice, or
judgments. Although traditional explicit measures often help to
understand the link between attitude and behavior, the IAT
might nevertheless increase the predictability of behavior by
adding an unconscious or implicit component (cf. Maison et al.,
2004). In general, any context in which associations between at
tributes and concepts operate at an implicit level would provide
a suitable and necessary setting for the use of the IAT.
In conclusion, the IAT appears to be both a valuable and
valid measure of implicit consumer social cognitions. Of
course, we have already acknowledged that the measure is
not a complete panacea and that some limitations or concerns
still remain. In particular, the relative nature of the measure
makes it impractical in some consumer settings. Also, more
is needed to be known with respect to the theoretical and
physiological underpinnings of how the IAT operates.
Finally, more evidence is needed to fully evaluate the IAT’s
relationship to behavior and the conditions associated with it.
However, it appears that the benefits and potential gains for
consumer research outweigh these concerns and the IAT pro
vides a much-needed implicit measure with strong psycho
metric properties.
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APPENDIX
Examples of Advertising Stimuli
Used for Study 2
Note that all ads were executed for both brands. This ap
pendix contains examples of the stimuli used in Study 2. In
total there were 32 versions created (2 brands × 8 sports × 2
ethnicities). Actual faces have been masked in this appendix,
but they were not masked in the experiment.

